The Kurdish Question in Syrian Legislation: From Denial to Partial Recognition
Origins and Geographical Distribution
The Kurds are among the oldest Indo-European peoples in the Middle East, with ethnic and linguistic roots tracing back to the Aryan peoples who settled the mountainous regions stretching from western Iran to eastern Anatolia.
Historical sources indicate that Kurds inhabited the Zagros and Taurus mountain ranges since antiquity and played a significant role during various periods of Islamic history. Their most prominent contribution emerged under the Ayyubid dynasty, founded by the renowned Kurdish leader Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin), whose rule extended over the Levant, Egypt, Yemen, and parts of Iraq. During these eras, the Kurds preserved their national identity through tribal structures, particularly in the areas spanning northern Iraq, eastern Anatolia, and northeastern Syria.
During the Ottoman era (1516–1918), Kurds settled in villages such as Amuda, Derik, and Rmeilan. Yet the Ottoman administration largely ignored their national identity, prompting them to preserve their language and communal structures within closed communities. Later, during the French Mandate, Kurdish migration to Syria increased due to the suppression of Kurdish nationalist uprisings in Turkey, especially following the Sheikh Said rebellion (1925) and the Dersim events (1937–1938). The French authorities capitalized on this influx to engineer demographic balances that served their political objectives.
The 1962 Extraordinary Census and Legislative Decree No. 93
The year 1962 marked a turning point in the legal relationship between the Syrian state and the Kurds. Legislative Decree No. 93 authorized an extraordinary census in al-Hasakah governorate, ostensibly to distinguish between “Syrian citizens” and “intruders,” a term referring to Kurdish refugees from Turkey. Conducted under conditions lacking fairness and transparency, the census required residents to produce official documents proving residence since 1945—papers rarely available to rural farmers.
The results were catastrophic. More than 120,000 Kurds were stripped of their Syrian nationality and divided into two categories: the ajanib al-Hasakah (foreigners of al-Hasakah), who were granted residency cards without citizenship rights, and the maktoumeen (unregistered), who were not legally recognized at all. The latter were denied access to education, property ownership, employment, and even the registration of marriages or deaths. This measure created generations of stateless Kurds and institutionalized marginalization for decades.
Ba’athist Ideology and the Denial of Ethnic Pluralism
When the Ba’ath Party seized power in 1963, Arab nationalism became the exclusive state ideology, and any expression of Kurdish identity was framed as a threat to national unity. Kurdish language use in public institutions was banned, Kurdish names for children were rejected at civil registries, and Kurdish publications were prohibited. Activists faced persecution and imprisonment. Despite slogans of “freedom, socialism, and unity,” Kurds were systematically excluded from political representation and influence.
Among the most severe policies was the “Arab Belt” project launched in 1973. This demographic engineering scheme aimed to establish an Arab strip along the Syrian-Turkish border. Kurdish-owned agricultural lands were confiscated under claims of state ownership, while Arab tribes from Raqqa were resettled in newly constructed “model villages.” At the same time, Kurdish residents were displaced from their ancestral lands, towns and villages were Arabized, and severe restrictions were imposed on property rights, construction, and access to basic services.
Marginalization extended to cultural and linguistic life. Kurdish was prohibited in formal education and even in private cultural activities. Publications in Kurdish—literary or folkloric—were banned under the pretext of safeguarding national unity. Symbolic expressions of Kurdish identity, such as celebrating Newroz (the Kurdish New Year), were criminalized, often met with security crackdowns and arrests on charges of sectarian incitement or disturbing public order. Even personal names were regulated: many families resorted to Arabic names for their children to avoid legal rejection or persecution.
Partial Shifts After 2011
With the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the authorities were compelled to make symbolic concessions to ease tensions, particularly in Kurdish-majority regions. Legislative Decree No. 49 of 2011 reinstated citizenship to some of the ajanib al-Hasakah, yet it excluded the maktoumeen, who continued to live without legal recognition or basic rights.
Some cultural restrictions were also loosened in a limited manner, allowing for Kurdish cultural events under strict security supervision. However, these steps fell short of genuine recognition of Kurdish national identity or its integration into Syria’s constitutional and institutional framework. They remained essentially security-driven measures, not comprehensive reforms.
Legislative Recommendations to Address the Kurdish Question
The legal and cultural status of the Kurds in Syria epitomizes systematic discrimination that extended far beyond citizenship revocation or political exclusion, reaching into civil, cultural, and economic rights. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive legal settlement rooted in principles of justice, recognition, and historical redress.
Such a settlement must begin with explicit constitutional recognition of ethnic pluralism and acknowledgement of the Kurds as an integral national component with full rights to language, identity, and cultural expression within a unified, democratic, and civil state. It further necessitates the restoration of stripped legal rights, including granting citizenship to all stateless Kurds affected by the 1962 census through a transparent and equitable mechanism.
At the legislative level, Syrian laws should undergo a thorough review to abolish discriminatory provisions and align with international human rights standards. Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights must be reinstated through the establishment of independent educational and cultural institutions free from security oversight. To prevent recurrence of abuses, permanent institutional mechanisms should be created to monitor minority rights policies, alongside efforts to cultivate a legal and social culture that values ethnic diversity as a source of strength rather than a threat.
In conclusion, the Kurdish question in Syria cannot be resolved through temporary security-driven measures or superficial concessions. It requires genuine constitutional will to redefine the state–society relationship on the basis of equal rights, recognizing ethnic diversity as essential to building a modern state of law grounded in justice, equality, and pluralism.
Read the article in Arabic HERE
Ibraheem Jabr is a seasoned legal professional with extensive expertise in international law, human rights, and commercial legal support. Based in Eindhoven, Netherlands,Ibraheem is the Founder and Legal Counsel at Legal Bridge, where they provide expert legal advice to EU-based government agencies and law firms navigating the complex legal landscape of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.